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Appellant

Greater

Park City

Company,

a Utah

corporation,

("appellant GPCC"), by and through its counsel Gordon Strachan,
Esq., and M. Alex Natt, Esq., of the

law

firm of Strachan &

Strachan, L.L.C., appeals from the decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("The Commission") denying appellant G P C C s Petition for
Redetermination of Sales Tax collected erroneously from appellant
GPCC during the periods June 1991 through June 1994 and May 1992
through

June

1994,

prior

to

the

Legislature's

July

1,

1994

amendment of the statute following the Court of Appeals' decision
in 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert,

denied

878 P.2d 454 (Utah 1994).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Tax Commission's Findings of Fact are published at R9-R11.
These

Findings

are

substantial evidence.

entitled

to

deference

if

supported

by

Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Division

of the State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 887

(Utah 1992).

Appellant GPCC does not challenge the Commission's

Findings of

Fact.

This Court should accept the Findings of the Commission as

true and proceed to a review of the Commission's Conclusion of Law.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
The Commission's application of the Findings of Fact to the
law is contained

in its "Analysis" section.

(R13-R19) .

These

legal conclusions by the Commission are accorded no deference.
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610(1) (a) (b) . The appellee incorrectly states
1

the

standard

of

review.

This

Court

may

not

discretion" to decisions of the Tax Commission.

grant

"optional

Ld.

Appellant

GPCC challenges the Commission's Conclusion of Law as they are set
forth in the Commission's Analysis section. (R13-R18).
The Commission's conclusion that appellant GPCC does not have
standing to bring this appeal is not supported by the Findings of
Fact.

The Commission's application of the law in the Analysis

section to the Findings of Fact in R9-R11 is therefore incorrect.
The Commission correctly found in Finding #7 that appellant
GPCC does not print the amount of sales tax on its lift and summer
activity tickets, but includes the sales tax in the price.

This

Finding supports appellant GPCC's right to bring this appeal.
Finding #8 similarly supports appellant GPCC's position.

The

Commission determined that "[appellant GPCC] has regularly filed
sales tax returns and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon."
(RIO).

Appellant GPCC is therefore the taxpayer who paid the tax

to the state of Utah.

Finding #8 further states that appellant

GPCC claimed and retained 1.5% of its sales tax burden as permitted
by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-108(3) . This fact does not establish that
appellant GPCC was not the taxpayer.
Finding #9 supports appellant GPCC's position.

Any ski area

operator could claim its share of the investment incentive to ski
resorts

provided

by

Utah

Code Ann.

2

§59-12-120, regardless

of

whether the ski resort chose to absorb and pay, or collect and
remit sales tax.
Finding #10 supports appellant GPCC's ability to claim the
refund

sought

in

the

instant

proceeding.

Appellant

GPCC's

accounting method can be employed to determine its sales tax burden
regardless

of

whether

appellant

GPCC

absorbed

and

paid,

or

collected and remitted its sales tax.
The Tax Commission's uncontested Findings of Fact contained at
R9-R11 do not support the Tax Commission's legal conclusion that
appellant GPCC lacks standing to bring this appeal.

This legal

conclusion is therefore erroneous and must be reversed.
Similarly erroneous is the appellee's argument that estoppel
should bar appellant GPCC's appeal. Estoppel does not apply to the
case at bar.

Appellant GPCC has not represented to the state of

Utah that it is not the taxpayer.

GPCC is the taxpayer in this

case. There has been no detrimental reliance by the state of Utah,
and estoppel does not apply in cases of erroneously withheld taxes.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLEE MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. THIS COURT OWES NO
DEFERENCE TO THE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION.
Appellee, the Customer Service Division of the Utah State Tax

Commission,

erroneously

asserts

appropriate standard of review.

3

that

the

following

is

the

In cases involving the application of law to the facts,
the court may grant some "optional discretion" to the
agency' s application of the law to the facts based on the
expertise of the agency in that particular area. Drake
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). . .
Thus, because the second and third questions presented
involve an area of special expertise of the Tax
Commission, the court should apply the deferential
standard
set forth in Drake when
reviewing the
Commission's application of the law to the facts.
Brief of Appellee at p. 2-3.
This is not the correct standard of review to be applied in
this case.
supra

Unlike decisions of the Industrial Commission, Drake,

or the Department of Employment Security, Boyd v. Dep't v.

Employment
governed

Sec. , 773 P. 2d 398
by

Utah's

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), which are

Administrative

Procedures

Act,

the

Utah

Legislature in 1996 established a different, specific standard of
review to be applied to decisions of the Tax Commission.
Ann. §59-1-610(1)(a)(b)

(1996 as amended).

Utah Code

The Tax Commission's

Conclusions of Law are granted no deference, and this Court should
not grant "optional discretion" as the appellee Customer Service
Division suggests.

B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 934

P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
In addition, "optional discretion" is granted only to those
administrative
expertise.
Court's

agencies

which

have

demonstrated

a

particular

Drake. The Tax Commission's "expertise", prior to this

holding

in

49th

Street

4

Galleria,

consisted

of

taxing

companies if their particular activities began with the letter "s".
According to Roger Tew of the Utah Tax Commission:
The area of admissions has been an extremely thorny area
for the tax commission for a number of years. What is or
what is not a place of amusement, what is or what is not
an admission has been frankly handled on a very random
basis for a long time.

Having said that, what we currently have is a complete
hodge-podge of items that are taxable and those that are
not. . .[The items that are taxed have been]
euphemistically referred to as the S-Test over the years.
If it started with "S" it was taxed, and if it didn't it
was not. (R34).
This Court would err in this case if it were to grant the Tax
Commission any deference based on an assertive "expertise" for the
period before the Legislature's July 1, 1994 amendment.
II.

THIS COURT WOULD ERR IP IT SUMMARILY AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE TAX COMMISSION.
The appellee asks this Court to affirm summarily the decision

of the Commission. The appellee erroneously asserts that appellant
GPCC has not "marshaled" the evidence in order to contest the
Findings of Fact.

Brief of Appellee at p. 7.

However, appellant

GPCC does not challenge the Commission's Findings of Fact.
Rll).

(R9-

Appellant GPCC instead challenges the application of these

facts to the law, contained in the Commission's "Analysis" (R1319) .

Appellee's argument, that appellant GPCC did not marshal the

evidence misses the point and ignores the Utah Supreme Court's
controlling authority:
5

[i]f the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports the
findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's Conclusions of Law and
the application of that law in the case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
Appellant GPCC challenges the application of the law to the
facts in the "Analysis" section of the Tax Commission's decision;
that is not a question of marshaling the facts.

It would be error

for this Court to affirm summarily the decision of the Commission
without examining the Commission's application of the law to the
facts.

This Court's review of the Tax Commission's application of

the law is done without deference.

B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State

Tax Comm'n., 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
III. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION OF LAW, IN ITS "ANALYSIS" SECTION,
THAT APPELLANT GPCC DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS
APPEAL, IS ERROR.
The Commission, in its "Analysis" section, concludes that:
[T]he issue of whether the charges of Petitioner [GPCC]
are for an admission is a moot issue because the refund
cannot be paid to Petitioner regardless of whether or not
the charges were for an admission.
The Commission
therefore, finds that Petitioner lacks the standing to
request the refunds. (R19).
The Commission, in reaching this conclusion, applied the facts
found in R9-R11 to the law of standing.
is accorded no deference by this Court.

The Commission's decision
B.L. Key, Inc. v.

State Tax Comm'n., 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

6

Utah

The Commission's conclusion that appellant GPCC lacks standing
is mistaken as a factual and legal matter.

The Commission's own

Findings of Fact (R9-R11) do not support its Conclusion of Law and
its ultimate decision to deny appellant GPCC standing to bring this
appeal. (R19)
According to the Utah Supreme Court:
[s]tanding is a flexible legal concept designed to
preserve the integrity of judicial adjudication by
requiring that legal issues be adequately defined and
crystallized so that judicial procedures focus on
specific, well-defined legal and factual issues. To that
end, the parties must have both a sufficient interest in
the subject matter of the dispute and a sufficient
adverseness so that the issues can be properly explored.
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869
P.2d 909, 913

(Utah 1993).

Standing requires suffering of a

distinct and palpable injury which gives rise to a personal stake
in the outcome of the dispute.

Id.

Appellant GPCC's distinct and palpable injury is the Tax
Commission's collection of $3,054,895.36 in sales taxes on lift
tickets and $185,624.79 in sales taxes on tickets for its summer
activities.
taxes.

Appellant GPCC is the taxpayer because it paid the

Utah law permits a business either to absorb and pay sales

taxes itself, or to collect the taxes from customers and remit
those funds to the state. Utah Code Ann. §59-12-107(1). Appellant
GPCC elected to absorb and pay the sales taxes; it did not collect
and remit the taxes.

(See Appellant's Brief at pp. 15-21).

7

The Commission, in its Analysis/Conclusion of Law section,
relies on the Findings of Fact in R9-R11 to try to justify its
conclusion

that

appellant

GPCC does not have

standing.

An

examination of these undisputed Findings of Fact demonstrates that
the Tax Commission's Conclusions of Law in its Analysis should be
overturned by this Court.
The Commission's Finding of Fact #7 confirms appellant GPCC s
standing to bring this appeal.
7.

The Commission states:

The tickets which are sold by Petitioner do not
have printed upon them the amount of sales tax,
which is included in the price charged for the
ticket.

(RIO)(emphasis added).

Appellant GPCC does not include the price

of sales tax on the face of its activity tickets because it has
chosen to pay sales tax out of its gross sales and not collect and
remit taxes as the appellee argues. The Commission cannot rely on
this Finding to support its decision that appellant GPCC is not the
taxpayer.
At Finding of Fact #8, the Commission states:
8.

Petitioner has regularly filed sales tax returns
and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon. On
those sales tax returns, Petitioner has claimed and
retained 1.5% of the tax amount as the vendor
discount as permitted by Utah Code Ann. §59-12108(3).
That statute permits vendors, who meet
certain requirements, to "retain an amount not to
exceed 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax
collected . . . "

8

Appellant GPCC did claim and retain the 1.5% vendor discount
as permitted by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-108(3).

However, this does

not require the conclusion that appellant GPCC is not the taxpayer.
Rather, Finding #8 states that "Petitioner has regularly filed
sales tax returns and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon."
(RIO).

As is explained in appellant GPCCs initial Brief at pp.

19-21, this Finding supports appellant GPCC's contention that it is
indeed the taxpayer in this case:
The "taxpayer" is the business which actually filed the
tax return. The Sales & Use Tax Act never uses the term
"taxpayer" to refer to customers purchasing good and
services, but only to refer to the entity who actually
signs the tax return and pays the sales tax to the stateFor the Tax Commission to make the Finding that appellant GPCC paid
the tax, and then, in the Analysis/Conclusion of Law section to
conclude that appellant GPCC is not the taxpayer is clear error.
Finding of Fact #9 states:
Petitioner has also claimed its share of the investment
incentive to ski resorts provided by §59-12-120, which
based the investment incentive upon the proportional
amount of "sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift
tickets."
The Ski Resort Investment Incentive Act assisted Utah's ski
resorts in their efforts to compete with out of state ski resorts
who are not required to pay sales tax on ski lift tickets.

This

Act entitled Utah's ski resorts to claim, from the state of Utah's
General Fund (not from a segregated, sales tax source only fund),
a cash incentive.

The plain language of the Act states:
9

The investment incentive is available to any person
operating a ski resort in the state of Utah . . .
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120(3)

(emphasis added).

Appellant GPCC

claimed its share of the investment incentive provided by §59-12120.

The Act does not, as the appellee Customer Service Division

argues, restrict this incentive to those ski areas which elect to
collect and remit sales tax.

Ski resorts which absorb and pay may

claim the incentive.
To determine how much money

each ski resort was to be

allocated from the state of Utah's General Fund, the Legislature
determined that:
The investment incentive paid out of the account shall be
allocated among ski resorts based on the relation between
the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift
tickets in Utah to the total sales tax collected from the
sale of ski lift tickets in Utah by each ski resort.
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120(2).

The appellee Customer Service

Division argues that the term ^collect" as used in the Act, would
preclude those ski resorts who choose to absorb and pay, rather
than collect and remit, sales taxes from claiming their portion of
the incentive.

However, that over-simplistic reading of the Act,

suggested by the appellee, conflicts with Utah law.

Utah law

authorizes any business to choose whether it will absorb and pay
sales tax out of its general revenues, or collect and remit sales
tax. Utah Code Ann. §58-12-107 (1) (a) ,. see also Robert H. Hinckley,
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 404 P. 2d 662 (Utah 1965) (Utah Supreme

10

Court rejected the argument that a vendor cannot absorb or pay the
sales tax himself) .

The interpretation urged by the appellee

Customer Service Division cannot stand.

Finding of Fact #10

states:
When Petitioner filed its sales tax returns, it
calculated the net amount of sales by dividing its gross
receipts by 1.0725, which was to discount the gross
amount by 6.25% for the sales and use tax, and one
(1.00%) percent for the resort area tax. Petitioner then
calculated the tax on the net amount after deduction of
the 6.25% for sales tax and the one (1.00%) percent for
resort area tax.
(Rll).

The accounting method chosen by appellant GPCC can be used

to determine the amount of sales tax apparently due, regardless of
whether that tax was to be paid out of appellant GPCC's general
funds received from its customers, or collected individually and
remitted from appellant GPCC's customers. Appellant GPCC's use of
the authorized, alternative accounting method does not indicate, as
the Tax Commission erroneously concludes, that appellant GPCC was
not the taxpayer who paid the tax.
The Findings of Fact relied upon by the Tax Commission in its
Analysis/Conclusion
standing,

do

not

of

Law

support

section,
that

to

deny

decision.

appellant
Rather,

the

GPCC
Tax

Commission's Findings of Fact at R9-R11 support appellant GPCC's
position that as the taxpayer it is the only entity with standing
to seek a refund of the erroneously-assessed sales tax.

11

The

Commission's Conclusion of Law that appellant GPCC lacks standing
to bring this appeal, is erroneous.
IV

THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR GPCC'S CLAIMS BECAUSE
REQUIRING THE CUSTOMER SERVICE DIVISION TO REFUND ILLEGALLY
COLLECTED TAXES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL DETRIMENT.
The appellee Customer Service Division's argument that the

doctrine of estoppel bars appellant GPCC's claims for this refund
also fails.

None of three of the essential elements of estoppel

exist in this case.

Those three essential elements are:

(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the
claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party
on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing
the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act.
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P. ,:Id b89,
694 (Utah 1979). The appellee Customer Service Division has failed
to establish the existence of any of these elements.
The appellee Customer Service Division argues that the first
element of estoppel is satisfied because "Park City filed tax
returns and claimed that it collected tax from its customers."
Brief of Appellee at p. 13. Appellant GPCC filed tax returns and
paid the tax shown due.

..PCC is the taxpayer. Appellant GPCC did

not include sales tax on the face of its lift and activity tickets
but chose instead to absorb and pay its sales tax out of its own
general fund.

12

Appellee argues that appellant GPCC claimed that it had
collected tax from its customers.

Appellant GPCC did collect its

$263,541 share of the appropriated General Fund amount under Utah
Code Ann. §59-12-120, but as discussed above, this investment
incentive was available to any ski area operator regardless of how
they choose to pay their sales tax.

The only representations made

by appellant GPCC support its claim that it is the taxpayer in this
case.
The appellee next claims that the second element of estoppel
is satisfied because money it received from appellant GPCC has
allegedly been budgeted and spent in reliance on appellant GPCC's
supposed representations. This claim suffers from two fatal flaws.
First, the appellee has failed to produce any evidence that the Tax
Commission

changed

its

position

representations by appellant GPCC.

in

reliance

on

any

alleged

The appellee has not shown

that, but for appellant GPCC's filing of its sales tax returns, the
Tax Commission would not have budgeted and spent the erroneously
collected tax.

In addition, appellant GPCC was due the ski resort

investment appropriation regardless of whether it absorbed and
paid, or collected and remitted its sales tax. Utah Code Ann. §5912-120.
The appellee fails to cite a single case in support of its
plea to apply estoppel.

Neither a case or theory of government

budgeting would apply the doctrine to facts such as these because
13

if estoppel applied on these facts, it would have to apply in every
tax refui id case.

Other states have uniformly held that spending

wrongfully collected taxes does not constitute a change in position
for purposes of estoppel.

Pennsylvania Co. for Banking & Trusts v.

Philadelphia, 76 A.2d 443, 445, 167 Pa.Super. 637, 641 (1950)

("The

city did not shift its position; it merely kept and spent the taxes
it had unlawfully taken from the Company.")

Eveii if the appellee

Customer Service Division had produced any evidence of reliance,
that

reliance

would

be

unreasonable

because

Utah

Code

Ann.

§59-12-110(2) places the Tax Commission on notice that a refund may
be requested at: any time within three years of the tax payment.
Finally, the appellee claims that it would suffer legal injury
by being forced to refund the money it illegally collected from
appellant

GPCC.

However,

being

required

to

return

illegally

collected taxes cannot constitute legal detriment because the state
was

i: i o t: e i 11 i 11 e d

to

r e ce i ve

that

in o i i e \

in

t he

first

place.

Pennsylvania Co. for Banking & Trusts, 76 A.2d at 445 ("Estoppel is
ai I equitab] e
obligation

defense,

arising

and

from

it
A

the

is

not

available

unmoral

to

practice

avoid

the

una*.

[governments], in general, kept and used for [government] purposes,
funds however erroneously paid and in ilawfully received b;; , tl .em. ' " ) .
Estoppel

does

not

apply

in

cases

such

as

this.

E.g.

P e n n s y l v a n i a C o . for Banking & T r u s t , 7 6 A. 2d at 4 4 5 ; L o n a a c r e Park
H e a t i n g C o . v. D e l a w a r e C o u n t y , 50 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. 1948) . If
14

the

mere

filing

of

a

tax

return

constitutes

a

binding

representation for purposes of estoppel, then every refund would be
denied. Necessarily, each petitioner will always have made such a
representation because he will have already paid the taxes at issue
in the claimed refund.
Second, if merely budgeting and spending revenues constituted
reasonable reliance, then that element will always be satisfied
because every state budgets and spends its revenues.

Third, if

being forced to return illegally collected revenues constitutes
legal detriment, then that element will always be satisfied because
a refund necessarily requires a return of funds.
In short, if estoppel bars appellant GPCC's refund in this
case, then it bars all refunds in all cases.

Such a result is not

permissible because it conflicts with the Legislature's clear
directive that any overpayment or wrongfully collected taxes "shall
be refunded." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2).
CONCLUSION
Appellant GPCC does not contest the Findings of Fact of the
Commission
application

at

R9-R11.

of the

Appellant

law to these

Commission's "Analysis'' section.

GPCC
facts

does
as

(R13-19) .

challenge

contained

the

in the

The Commission's

decision, that appellant GPCC does not have standing to bring this
appeal, is not supported by the Findings of Fact. The decision is
erroneous and should be reversed.
15

DATED th is

*

l

1<

day of September, 1997.

STRACHAN & STRACHAN

rV.-k.

BY
M. Alex Natt
Attorneys for Appellant
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